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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this action alleging racial discrimination in violation of 
42 U.S.C. SS 1981 and 1983, and Title VII, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Janet Evans, finding that her 
employer, the Port Authority of New Jersey, discriminated 
against her when it failed to promote her to the position of 
client manager in 1994. Evans was awarded back pay, front 
pay, and compensatory damages. The District Court also 
granted her request for attorney's fees. The Port Authority 
contends that the District Court erred in denying its motion 
for a new trial as to liability and damages, and in 
calculating the amount of the fee award. Evans cross- 
appeals, contending that the District Court erred in 
granting the Port Authority's motion for remittitur and in 
failing to allow the jury to consider the issue of punitive 
damages. 
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Because we are convinced that the Port Authority's 
allegations of error relating to the liability portion of the 
verdict clearly lack merit, we direct our primary attention to 
the damage and attorney's fees awards. Although we 
recognize that the award for emotional damages is atypical, 
and though we may have arrived at a different calculation 
had the award been ours to determine in the first instance, 
we find that the figure set by the District Court has 
substantial support in the record. The attorney's fees award 
is more problematic. Our review of the billing records 
submitted by Evans' counsel establishes that the District 
Court did not devote adequate attention to the hours 
expended and the duplication of effort by Evans' attorneys; 
reduction in the fee award is warranted. For the reasons set 
forth herein, we will conditionally affirm the order of the 
District Court denying the Port Authority's motion for a new 
trial and granting its motion for remittitur. We will vacate 
the District Court's order approving the award of attorney's 
fees and will remand this matter for a recalculation of the 
award. 
 
I. 
 
In 1993, Janet Evans, a Port Authority employee since 
1979, worked as a liaison between the Port Authority and 
government and business officials. The same year, Evans 
applied and was interviewed for the Port Authority position 
of client manager. Eight total candidates were considered, 
including four white candidates, three black candidates, 
and one Hispanic applicant. Three of the candidates, 
Evans, Laura Toole, and Dan Maynard, were interviewed by 
Angelo Dinome, a white male. 
 
In January 1994 Evans learned that the client manager 
position would be filled by Toole, a white female. She also 
learned that Maynard, a white male, had been promoted to 
the position of senior information officer. This position had 
never been advertised and Evans was not aware that it was 
open. Evans challenged Toole's appointment and Maynard's 
promotion, claiming that each was the result of 
discrimination based on race. She filed a complaint alleging 
racial discrimination with the EEOC in April 1994. The 
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EEOC did not find probable cause to support Evans' 
allegations, but did issue a right to sue letter. 
 
On October 3, 1995, Evans filed a timely complaint in the 
District Court of New Jersey, alleging that "the actions of 
the [D]efendant[ ]1 in failing to promote her to the position 
of client manager were designed to deny her the 
opportunity for growth and [to] prevent her from advancing 
in the Port Authority solely on the basis of her race." She 
maintained, too, that the Port Authority provided"greater 
attention, benefits and support to non-African American 
employees by way of preference for certain bonuses, 
incentives, and salaries." Evans contended that the 
appointment of Toole and the promotion of Maynard 
constituted proof of the Port Authority's impermissible 
preference. 
 
Following a multi-day jury trial in August 1999, the jury 
found that the Port Authority violated 42 U.S.C.SS 1981 
and 1983, and Title VII when it failed to promote Evans in 
1994. The jury awarded Evans $148,000 in back pay, 
$182,000 in front pay, and $1.15 million in compensatory 
damages. 
 
The Port Authority filed a motion for judgment N.O.V. or, 
in the alternative, for new trial.2 After evaluating thoroughly 
on the record each of the grounds asserted, the District 
Court denied the Port Authority's motions. The District 
Court instead granted the Port Authority's request for 
remittitur, reducing Evans' compensatory damages for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. An amended complaint named Angelo Dinome and Laura Toole as 
defendants. These individuals were never served and are not parties to 
this action. 
 
2. The Port Authority claimed entitlement to a new trial on seven 
grounds: 1) the verdict was contrary to the evidence and the law; 2) the 
evidence viewed most favorably to Evans was insufficient to support 
liability; 3) the damage awards were excessive; 4) the District Court 
erred 
in excluding from evidence the determination letter issued by the EEOC; 
5) remarks made by Evans' counsel during summation were sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant a new trial; 6) the District Court erred in 
"allowing 
testimony with reference to the 1998/1999 client manager selection 
process;" and 7) the District Court "erred in barring the testimony of two 
witnesses on behalf of [the] Port Authority." 
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emotional distress to $375,000. Ultimately, the District 
Court approved a request for attorney's fees made by 
Evans' counsel in the amount of $635,555.71. 
 
The Port Authority filed this timely appeal raising issues 
relevant to liability, damages, and fees. Evans filed a timely 
cross-appeal raising issues bearing solely upon damages. 
 
II. 
 
We turn first to the Port Authority's argument that it is 
entitled to a new trial on the question of liability. The Port 
Authority bases this argument on allegations of error which 
include the District Court's admitting or excluding multiple 
items of evidence, permitting allegedly inflammatory 
comments made by counsel for Evans during summation, 
and inadequately charging the jury.3 These allegations do 
not merit extended discussion. We have conducted a 
meticulous review of the record as it bears upon each of 
these alleged errors and are convinced that the District 
Court's rulings were supported by the law and the facts 
and were consistent with the sound exercise of judicial 
discretion.4 We do not find anything in the record to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Port Authority alleges specifically that the District Court erred: 
in 
admitting evidence regarding the filling of a client manager position open 
in 1999; excluding evidence of the EEOC finding of"no discrimination"; 
permitting Evans' counsel to question a Port Authority employee 
regarding his status in two other lawsuits; allowing an Evans' co-worker 
to testify as to her reaction to the promotion process; admitting Evans' 
statements regarding her qualifications, views of the promotion process, 
and interview notes; excluding check lists and notes relevant to other 
candidates; and permitting Evans' counsel to make inflammatory 
remarks during summation. The Port Authority also alleges that the 
District Court erred in instructing the jury with respect to disparate 
impact, and failed to instruct the jury regarding the theory of respondeat 
superior and causation. 
 
4. With respect to a number of the alleged errors, there is support in the 
record for application of a plain error standard. Most of the evidentiary 
decisions about which the Port Authority complains were made without 
objection, or were influenced by the Port Authority's failure to comply 
with the District Court's admonition to make submissions in a timely 
manner or to lay a proper foundation for evidence which it sought to 
 
                                5 
  
support the Port Authority's assertion that the District 
Court erred in failing to grant a new trial with respect to 
liability. 
 
III. 
 
We focus next upon the components of the damage 
award, considering first the Port Authority's contention that 
the front and back pay awards must be vacated because 
the District Court failed to give the jury clear instructions 
as to how these awards were to be calculated. 
 
Examination of the record establishes that the Port 
Authority never objected to and, in fact, agreed to the 
adequacy of the front and back pay instructions. We have 
reviewed those instructions and find that they gave the jury 
ample guidance as to the law and the method of calculating 
these awards. 
 
We reject, too, the Port Authority's contention that the 
evidence submitted to the jury was insufficient to support 
the awards. Again, context is important. As the District 
Court made clear in its ruling on the Port Authority's 
motion for a new trial, the quality of the evidence 
introduced with respect to front and back pay lay largely in 
the hands of the Port Authority; the Port Authority was 
responsible for and should not now be heard to complain 
about lack of detail in the evidence. The position of the 
District Court is set forth in the transcript of the ruling on 
the motion for a new trial: 
 
       The Court: I will not permit, in light of what I just read 
       and the struggles that [Evans] had to undergo to get 
       basic, basic, salary information, from which [she] could 
       workup [sic] some kind of a chart or graph, or. . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
introduce. It is also clear that the jury instructions to which the Port 
Authority now objects were, at the very least, acquiesced to by counsel 
for the Port Authority prior to the charge. The Port Authority failed to 
object to these instructions at the time that they were delivered or prior 
to the time that the jury retired to consider its verdict. Because we have 
not found error under the more stringent abuse of discretion standard, 
it follows that we do not find plain error. 
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       some kind of easy specifics for this jury to work with, 
       I will not permit [the Port Authority] to attack the 
       manner in which this financial information ultimately 
       was presented to the jury. 
 
        As I recall eventually we did receive the numbers -- 
       was there a stipulation ultimately worked out, counsel? 
 
       [Counsel for Evans]: Yes. 
 
       [Counsel for the Port Authority]: Yes. 
 
       The Court: Flat out numbers. That are consistent with 
       the findings [the jury] made about what [Evans] had 
       lost by being deprived of the promotion that she sought 
       . . . brought forth and into the future. The . . . jury was 
       told about how old [Evans] was. What her career path 
       had been. About her devotion to her job. She testified 
       that she had an interest in remaining in her position 
       and pursuing promotions along the line of work that 
       she was doing. And she was quite specific . . . about 
       that . . . . 
 
       * * * * 
 
        Therefore, I am not disturbing the jury's awards on 
       front and back pay. 
 
(Evans App. G, p. 26-27). We, too, decline to disturb the 
jury's calculation of the front and back pay awards. 
 
IV. 
 
We next address the Port Authority's contention that it is 
entitled to a new trial because the jury's compensatory 
damage award of $1.15 million "was not supported by the 
evidence and was grossly excessive, `reflect[ing]' a jury 
driven by mistake, passion, prejudice or partiality." 
 
We review the District Court's decision not to grant a new 
trial for abuse of discretion. Our precedent establishes that 
a District Court reviewing a jury verdict has an"obligation 
. . . to uphold the jury's award if there exists a reasonable 
basis to do so."  Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 
1223, 1230 (3d Cir. 1989). "[T]he court may not vacate or 
reduce the award merely because it would have granted a 
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lesser amount of damages." Id. A new trial is warranted 
based "upon [a] showing that `the jury verdict resulted from 
passion or prejudice.' " Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Depart., 
174 F.3d 95, 114 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 
1074 (2000) (quoting Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1383 
(3d Cir. 1993)). "[T]he size of the award alone [is not] 
enough to prove prejudice and passion." Id.  The Port 
Authority argues that because of allegedly improper 
evidentiary and other trial errors, the jury could not have 
been impartial in determining compensatory damages. 
 
Because we have rejected the allegations of error upon 
which the Port Authority bases its impartiality argument, 
we reject as well the Port Authority's argument that the 
alleged errors tainted the jury's verdict. Nonetheless, we 
have an obligation, as did the District Court, to ensure that 
the compensatory damage award finds support in the 
record and that the jury did not "abandon analysis for 
sympathy." Gumbs v. Pueblo International, Inc., 823 F.2d 
768, 773 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
Recognizing this obligation, the District Court discussed 
in great detail the evidence supporting an award of 
compensatory damages,5 specifically rejecting the Port 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This evidence consisted solely of Janet Evans' testimony: 
 
       [As a result of the Port Authority's actions] I started having 
chest 
       pains and shortness of breath. I was sent to the[Port Authority] 
       medical department [on] four, five different occasions, had an EKG 
       taken and [was] sent home and I started taking blood pressure 
       medicine. I have also been moody and irritable all of the time. And 
       it affected my relationship with my children. 
 
       I was a grouch. Okay. Candidly I was a grouch. Affected my 
       relationship with my husband. 
 
       I was a grouch. I am sure I could use another word, but I will say 
       grouch for the court. It affected me on almost every level of my 
       existence. It made me question my ability. I said to myself, you 
       know, maybe I am not as smart as I think I am. Maybe I can't do 
       this and, you know, I am only doing this for at the time 17, 18 
       years, maybe I don't have the stuff it takes to do this. 
 
       And then I had to get myself together and talk to somebody 
       professionally and -- I renewed my spirit, because I think that if 
you 
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Authority's argument that the jury's verdict was the result 
of passion or prejudice. The Court found that the jury, in 
awarding compensatory damages, considered Evans' 
demeanor and testimony against the background of the 
testimony and demeanor of Port Authority witnesses: 
 
       One of the things that judges have to do in examining 
       the challenge to whether a jury was carried away by 
       bias and passion and prejudice and sympathy and all 
       of the other wrongful motives, in awarding a large 
       award of damages. It was what went on in the 
       courtroom and the judges own observations of the jury. 
       And I remember that moment very clearly, as a 
       moment in which this jury was struck as forcibly as it 
       could be struck by [the Port Authority's witness's] 
       certainly inadvertent description of this process as a 
       joke. 
 
        I find that the demeanor of [this Port Authority 
       witness], which was alternatively somewhat arrogant, 
       somewhat embarrassed and generally unpersuasive 
       . . . was a typical kind of reaction given, the substance 
       of what was slowly but surely being demonstrated to 
       this jury. 
 
       * * * * 
 
        [I]t is very important to me to examine[Evans'] 
       testimony and what she put in by way of proofs with 
       what exactly was proven to this jury by the testimony 
       with the very people who could have and should have 
       and [in] some cases did respond to her but responded 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       let it, what happens to us African Americans is, okay, it can drive 
       you crazy if you let it, and people go into offices and shoot 
people 
       up and do all kinds of things. If you allowed the anger that 
develops 
       as a result of constantly being made to feel you are not as good 
as, 
       if you don't have some strong faith, some strong-- 
 
       * * * * 
 
       I had my parents, I had my God. And as a consequence I kept my 
       mind; but I was in bad shape. Okay. And I am still angry. 
 
(Port Auth. App. X, p. 93-96.) 
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       to her in [a way] that was totally oblivious of . . . her 
       concerns, which could not have been more clearly 
       expressed. 
 
        I find that as much as her testimony about . . . her 
       disposition, her relationship with the people nearest 
       and dearest to her, the family and her children and her 
       husband, is the observation that she made. [S]he 
       herself was designated to train the very people who 
       were brought in from the outside to fill a position, 
       which she was part of the creation of and which she far 
       better than they could have filled . . . Much more 
       importantly, the impact of being asked to train the very 
       people who were filling the job on a consistent level 
       that one is not promoted [to], is an enduring and long 
       standing curb on the ability to enjoy one's job that 
       cannot be ignore[d] by the Court. 
 
       * * * * 
 
       Janet Evans had a tremendous impact on this jury, 
       there is no doubt in this Court's mind, I was here, and 
       I sat the closest to her, of anybody, and I had the 
       direct view of how the jury reacts . . . [T]his jury liked 
       Janet Evans not because she pandered to them . . . 
       [Her] demeanor . . . was that of a proud, accomplished, 
       intelligent woman whose faith in herself was shattered 
       by consistent refusal . . . to give her what she felt 
       rightly was [hers] . . . . 
 
(Evans App. G. p. 55-59.) The District Court also concluded 
that the verdict was not the result of undue sympathy on 
the part of the jury: 
 
       [I] don't find, either from what was on the record or 
       from the amounts awarded, that this was a run away 
       jury . . . . 
 
        They were instructed frequently . . . that they were 
       not to let passion or prejudice blind them. . . . They 
       were reminded frequently they should use their 
       common sense in their own collective judgment. I find 
       that is what happened here with respect to the jury's 
       findings. Particularly, as they are supported by the 
       evidence. 
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(Evans App. H. p. 96-97) 
 
Based on the District Court's observations with respect to 
the totality of the evidence, the demeanor of the witnesses, 
and the reaction of the jury, we are unable to conclude that 
the jury verdict resulted from passion or prejudice. 
Consequently, we find that the District Court's decision to 
deny the Port Authority's motion for a new trial was 
consistent with the sound exercise of judicial discretion. 
 
V. 
 
Although the District Court rejected the Port Authority's 
argument that the compensatory damage verdict returned 
by the jury required that a new trial be granted, the Court 
did find that the award was excessive. Accordingly, the 
Court granted remittitur to $375,000, an amount it 
characterized as "the maximum award that a reasonable 
jury could impose in this case." 
 
The Port Authority does not argue on appeal that the 
$375,000 award is excessive. We are instead presented with 
the anomalous situation where it is the plaintiff who 
challenges the remittitur. Normally, where a District Court 
denies a defendant's motion for a new trial as to damages, 
yet concludes that a jury verdict is excessive, warranting 
remittitur, denial of the motion for new trial is conditioned 
on the plaintiff's acceptance of the remittitur. Any 
remittitur accepted by the plaintiff in that situation is not 
appealable. See Lowe v. General Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 
1373, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980). The order denying the Port 
Authority's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages 
here was not conditioned on Evans' acceptance of the 
remittitur. Thus, Evans appeals, asking that we reinstate 
the jury's verdict awarding her $1.15 million in 
compensatory damages. 
 
Our role in reviewing the District Court's decision to 
remit the damage award here is "severely limited." Gumbs, 
823 F.2d at 771. The use of remittitur "clearly falls within 
the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision cannot be 
disturbed by this court absent a manifest abuse of 
discretion." Spence v. Bd. of Educ. of the Christina Sch. 
Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200 (3d Cir. 1986). "The district 
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judge is in the best position to evaluate the evidence 
presented and determine whether or not the jury has come 
to a rationally based conclusion." Id. at 1201. Where the 
District Court has decided that remittitur is appropriate, we 
must accord that decision additional deference. Delli Santi 
v. CNA Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 192, 206 (3d Cir. 1996). "[W]e 
must give the benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the 
trial judge." Gumbs, 823 F.2d at 773. 
 
Evans does not cite any other discrimination case from 
any other jurisdiction where an award approaching the 
jury's verdict of over $1 million was sustained. Nonetheless, 
we recognize that the issue to be decided here "is not the 
size of the award alone, but the evidence supporting the 
award." Blakely v. Continental Airlines, Inc. , 992 F. Supp. 
731, 737 (D.N.J. 1998). Evans' attempt to justify the size of 
the award by reference to the record is unpersuasive. She 
summarizes the evidence supporting the original verdict as 
follows: 
 
       [Evans'] testimony clearly established the invidious 
       effect of race discrimination upon a human being. . . . 
       She was made to suffer the indignity of being qualified 
       for a job and being turned down nine times. She was 
       upset, she was traumatized, she would, on occasion 
       become ill. This sorry state occurred over a period of 
       ten years. 
 
Although we agree with Evans that "racial discrimination 
is vicious, destructive, and debilitating," we are not 
persuaded that the evidence of emotional distress adduced 
here is remotely sufficient to support the jury verdict. The 
verdict was "so large as to appear contrary to reason," and 
the District Court's decision to grant remittitur was well 
within the discretion reserved to it. Blakely , 992 F. Supp. 
at 735. 
 
Our examination of the remitted award does not end 
here. Despite the fact that the Port Authority does not 
challenge the $375,000 award as excessive, we have an 
independent responsibility to review the award in order to 
determine if it is rationally based. Our precedent recognizes 
"an increasing appellate trend to review the merits of a 
damage award, even though our scope of review is limited." 
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Williams v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 817 F.2d 1030 (3d 
Cir. 1987). In order to satisfy our obligation we must, 
according the benefit of any doubt to the judgment of the 
District Court, assess whether the District Court erred in 
fixing Evans' damages for emotional distress at $375,000. 
 
On review, we may not require the District Court fixing a 
remittitur to reduce an award to less than the largest 
verdict that could be allowed without requiring a new trial. 
That is, remittitur should be set at the " `maximum 
recovery' that does not shock the judicial conscience." 
Gumbs, 823 at 774. The District Court specifically applied 
this maximum recovery rule: 
 
       Applying the Gumbs line which is . . . the line between 
       an excessive jury award and the maximum award that 
       a reasonable jury could impose in this case [,] I am 
       granting remittitur . . . to $375,000. 
 
(Evans App. p. 117) The District Court then turned to the 
evidence supporting this award. Because this evidence is 
critical to our review, we cite the District Court's comments 
at some length: 
 
       Judges must proceed with caution when a challenge to 
       an award is based upon emotional distress. . . . One of 
       the ways in which I would respond to that challenge is 
       to consider the demeanor of the jury and what went on 
       in front of the jury which may have [led it] to conclude 
       that [its] empathic abilities could be exercised a certain 
       way. . . . 
 
        [W]hen the jury heard distressful testimony or 
       observed witnesses squirming or coming out with 
       arguments or statements like Mr. Codd that he 
       considered the lawsuit to be a joke. That this shows 
       how inflamed the jury was. And how much it wanted to 
       slam the Port Authority. I disagree. 
 
        I think that it demonstrates a certain amount of 
       drama that went on here and that the jury is enabled 
       to get a glimpse of what was the evidence that it was 
       describing. Not glimpses into things that the jury had 
       no evidence of and could only speculate about, but 
       things that Miss Evans described. Such as her feelings 
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       of -- I don't know if she said the word worthless, but 
       she began to doubt herself. Indications as to whether 
       or not all of this was worth it and . . . she called herself 
       a grouch. I would take the liberty of saying . . . that 
       Miss Evans kind of smiled and said grouch . . . and we 
       all know that she meant bitch. . . . 
 
        I find that the moments I've described were such-- 
       where Miss Evans by dint of her own personality that 
       of a strong professional woman that I earlier described, 
       did not indicate such distress as would make it 
       impossible for her to go to work. The jury could still 
       have had an insight of what it was like to work in an 
       environment where people said such things as Mr. 
       Breznoff said, and yet did things as Mr. Breznoff did, or 
       called for. Called her lawsuit a joke. Or where her 
       supervisors, even though they had far less experience 
       and even though promoted to the jobs through routes 
       that she could not have access to because of the 
       departmental option. 
 
        These are important things because there has been a 
       challenge that the level of emotional distress argued for 
       by this plaintiff is not supported by the evidence. 
 
(H 106-109) 
 
In sum, the District Court concluded that the evidence 
supporting the award of damages for emotional distress 
was not comprised of Evans' testimony alone. Evans' 
account of the physical and emotional toll of working at the 
Port Authority was, in the District Court's view, supported 
-- and dramatically so -- by the demeanor and testimony 
of Port Authority witnesses. 
 
Analyzing the evidence in light of governing precedent, 
the District Court found that the maximum reasonable 
award for emotional distress totaled $375,000. The District 
Court recognized, as do we, that this is a substantial 
amount, well above most emotional distress awards. Given 
the District Court's detailed analysis of the total evidence 
presented, however, and our extremely deferential standard 
of review, we are not prepared to conclude that the award 
lies outside the bounds of reason. Clearly, this was not a 
typical case and Evans' emotional trauma cannot"be 
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cavalierly dismissed." Blakely, 992 F. Supp. at 734. We are 
convinced that in fixing the remittitur the District Court 
has "endeavored to follow [our] instructions, consider 
similar cases, evaluate the evidence and determine a 
damages figure that [was] rationally related to [that] 
evidence, mindful that `[t]he determination of that amount 
may not be precisely calculated.' " Id.  992 F. Supp. at 739 
(quoting Gumbs, 823 F.2d at 774). We cannot say that the 
amount awarded by the District Court demonstrated a 
manifest abuse of discretion. Consequently, we will not 
disturb the award. 
 
VI. 
 
The last of the alleged errors in the District Court's 
treatment of damages -- the decision not to submit the 
issue of punitive damages to the jury -- is raised by Evans 
in her cross appeal. According to Evans, "[t]he District 
Court dismissed the punitive damage count against the 
[Port Authority], ruling that the [Port Authority] is entitled 
to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment." 
 
Evans misstates the basis for the District Court's ruling. 
The District Court did not hold that the Port Authority was 
immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh  
Amendment.6 It held, instead, that the Port Authority, a 
hybrid entity with many of the characteristics of a 
municipality, is subject to suit but is, nonetheless, immune 
from punitive damages. 
 
The District Court's conclusion is supported by the 
caselaw. In Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 
F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1991), we found that punitive damages 
may not be assessed against SEPTA, the regional transit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The authority cited by Evans is, therefore, inapposite. See College 
Sav. 
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 
(1999) (holding that sovereign immunity of State of Florida was neither 
abrogated by Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived 
by Florida's activities in interstate commerce); and Seminole Tribe of 
Fla. 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (holding that despite Congress' 
construction of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and clear intent to 
abrogate sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause did not grant 
Congress that power). 
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authority created by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
We relied on the Supreme Court's decision in City of 
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), finding 
that municipalities are not subject to punitive damages 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1981: 
 
       The thrust of the Court's discussion in City of Newport 
       was that punitive damage awards against 
       municipalities would not serve the goals of punishment 
       or deterrence in the same way as punitive damage 
       awards against individuals found to have violated 
       Section 1983. This reasoning is fully applicable to 
       SEPTA. Awarding punitive damages against SEPTA 
       might result in increased taxes or fares and thus 
       punish taxpayers and users of mass transportation 
       who cannot be regarded . . . as bearing any guilt for 
       constitutional violations that SEPTA may commit.  
       Similarly, the deterrent effect that such awards may 
       have on SEPTA decision makers is far more speculative 
       than the deterrent effect of punitive damage awards on 
       individuals who violate Section 1983, and other means 
       of deterring violations by SEPTA officials . . . are readily 
       available. Finally, SEPTA would be a tempting target 
       for large punitive damage awards by juries unduly 
       influenced by SEPTA's size and revenues. . . . 
 
Bolden, 953 F.2d at 830-31 (citations omitted). We affirmed 
a decision of the District Court applying a similar analysis 
to conclude that the Port Authority, "as a hybrid entity with 
substantial connections to government, may not be 
assessed punitive damages" in King v. The Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey, 909 F. Supp. 938 (D.N.J. 1995), 
aff'd, 106 F.3d 385 (3d Cir. 1996). A number of other 
District Courts have reached the same conclusion. 7  See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Only one District Court has reached a contrary result. In Kondakjian 
v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., No. 94 Civ. 8013, 1996 WL 280799 at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1996), the District Court relied on the Supreme 
Court's decision in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 
30 (1994). There, the Supreme Court found that the Port Authority was 
not entitled to the Eleventh Amendment immunity applicable to states 
and state agencies, noting that the Port Authority is structured to be and 
is, in fact, financially self-sustaining. We agree with other District 
Courts 
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Vernon v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N. J., 154 F. Supp. 2d 844 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that entities, like Port Authority, 
created by bi-state compact should not be liable for 
punitive damages); Ryduchowski v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and 
N.J., No. 96-CV-5589, 1998 WL 812633 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 
1998) (same); Brady v. Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J., Nos. 
93 Civ. 1679, 95 CV 0442, 87 CV 2702, 1998 WL 724061 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1998) (same); Recreation World, Inc. v. 
Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., Nos. 96 Civ. 5549, 97 Civ. 5029, 
1998 WL 107362 (S.D.N.Y. March 19, 1998) (same); Rose v. 
Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 13 F. Supp.2d 516 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (same); Shifa Services, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and 
N.J., No. 96 Civ. 1361, 1997 WL 563301 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 
1997) (same). 
 
We are persuaded by the analysis adopted by these 
courts and conclude that the same considerations that 
underlay our decision in Bolden support the conclusion 
that the Port Authority, like SEPTA, is immune from 
punitive damages. We agree with the Court's analysis in 
Shifa that: 
 
       Considerations of public policy, including the goals of 
       punishment and deterrence of constitutional violations, 
       do not "dictate a contrary result." Although taxes 
       would not be affected by the award of punitive 
       damages against the Port Authority because it receives 
       no tax revenues and is financially independent of New 
       York and New Jersey, an award of punitive damages 
       might result in increased tolls, fares, and other 
       expenses borne by the public generally. The users of 
       Port Authority facilities cannot be regarded, "except 
       perhaps in an indirect and abstract sense," as bearing 
       any guilt for constitutional violations committed by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
which have considered the applicability of Hess  to punitive damage 
awards. These courts have held that the question considered by the 
Supreme Court in Hess -- immunity from suit in federal court under the 
Eleventh Amendment -- presents different considerations from the 
question of a public authority's immunity from punitive damages under 
Section 1983. The decision in City of Newport  supplies the appropriate 
framework for analysis. See, e.g., Shifa Services Inc., 1997 WL 563301 at 
*4. 
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       Port Authority. Also, the deterrent effect of punitive 
       damage awards on the Port Authority is more 
       speculative than the deterrent effect of punitive damage 
       awards on individuals who violate Section 1983. Other 
       means of deterring violations by Port Authority officials 
       are already available. . . . 
 
1997 WL 563301 at *5 (citations omitted). Based on this 
reasoning, we find that the District Court did not err in 
refusing to submit the issue of punitive damages to the 
jury. 
 
VII. 
 
We turn last to the Port Authority's challenge to the 
$635,555.71 fee award approved by the District Court. As 
the prevailing party in this action, Evans is entitled to 
recover attorney's fees and costs. See 42 U.S.C. S 1988(b) 
(providing, in the court's discretion, a reasonable attorney's 
fee to a successful litigant in 1981 and 1983 actions). "In 
cases like this, we use the `lodestar' formula, which 
requires multiplying the number of hours reasonably 
expended by a reasonable hourly rate." Loughner v. Univ. of 
Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
The Port Authority argues that the fee award should be 
reduced, asking us to review both the hourly rates and the 
duplicative nature of the billings. We review the 
reasonableness of an award for attorney's fees under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 
F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990). What standards to apply in 
calculating a fee award is a legal question subject to 
plenary review. Keenan v. City of Philadelphia , 983 F.2d 
459, 472 (3d Cir. 1992). We will not disturb the District 
Court's determination of an attorney's marketplace billing 
rate and number of hours reasonably expended absent 
clear error. Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of 
Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 1035 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The facts surrounding the District Court's determination 
of the fee award are particularly important to the issues 
raised by the Port Authority. In September 1999, counsel 
for Evans filed a request for attorney's fees and a 
certification with respect to hourly rates. The District Court 
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was asked to approve an award in the amount of 
$953,333.56. This amount included a lodestar of 
$628,027.50, costs and expenses totaling $7,483.21, and 
an upward enhancement of fifty (50%) percent. The fee 
application was first considered by the District Court in 
April 2000, when argument on post-trial motions was 
heard. 
 
At that time, the Port Authority opposed the fee request, 
arguing first that the information submitted by counsel for 
Evans was insufficient to support the requested billing rate 
of $300 per hour. In response to this argument, the 
following exchange took place: 
 
       The Court: What support has been adduced in the 
       record for the hourly rates charged by Mr. Ridley and 
       Mr. Hamlin? Aside from the certifications? 
 
       Mr. Ridley: Your Honor, we did not take affidavits of 
       the community of lawyers that are involved in Civil 
       Rights cases. I could have called Neil Mullen. I could 
       have called some other folks that I know who do this 
       type of litigation. 
 
       The Court: I think what really Mr. Burke is saying is 
       that you should have as well as could have . . . . 
 
        Neither side has produced the kind of evidence that 
       [the] Third Circuit seems to be adverting to in the 
       Hurley case. The Port Authority challenged the hourly 
       rate and it didn't produce any record evidence as[to] 
       why. And the plaintiff did not produce record evidence 
       for me to consider as to why its hourly rate is 
       appropriate. 
 
(Evans. App. H. p. 88-89) 
 
The court then directed the parties to file affidavits as to 
the customary and proper rate to be applied in this case 
--"whether or not when Ridley and Hamlin say $300 an 
hour is a reasonable amount . . . in the context of the civil 
rights case litigated up here in Northern New Jersey." These 
affidavits were not adversarial and, consequently, were not 
to be served on or responded to by the other side. Evans' 
attorneys' affidavits were to be filed on April 28th and the 
Port Authority's were due Friday, May 5th, by 5 o'clock. (Id. 
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p. 122) The Port Authority's counsel was admonished to "be 
on time when you file it." 
 
At the same hearing, counsel for the Port Authority 
argued that the fee request was unreasonable, too, because 
the billing sheets showed duplicative effort by Evans' 
attorneys. The Court rejected this argument, stating: 
 
        I have reviewed the amount of hours that have been 
       requested and . . . . I have to agree with Mr. Hamlin; 
       that when the decision was made not [to] try the case 
       alone that it was an appropriate decision and a 
       decision in this increasing[ly] difficult area of the law, 
       or any area of the law, is a wise decision that cases 
       that get tried alone very often are overwhelming the 
       attorney in trying to do it. . . [I]t was very evident that 
       it was a good thing that Mr. Hamlin and Mr. Ridley 
       [were] there . . . . 
 
        I am not offended that both lawyers were working on 
       this case both during the trial, nor at times during the 
       preparation of the case whether it was witness prep[,] 
       attendance of depositions and the like. And therefore, 
       I don't find that the number of hours requested for 
       those particular efforts to be excessive. And the Court 
       is not obliged to go line, by line, by line. And I am 
       aware there was an effort and I think there was an 
       appropriate effort on the part of the defendant to bring 
       to the Court's attention several lines of billing where 
       there was a challenge. But in all it seems to boil down 
       to whether or not more than one attorney was working 
       on a case at a given time and I've already indicated 
       that I find that it is appropriate that did not go on 
       throughout the entire case. 
 
        I find too, that on those occasions when Mr. Hamlin 
       billed for 18 hours, I hate to say it, but I have done 
       that too. We have all done it. Then Mr. Hamlin didn't 
       do it so often to make the request outrageous . . ., it is 
       very very hard and it is very time consuming. The total 
       legal fee requested in excess of $600,000 based upon 
       the hourly rate requested by these attorneys, whether 
       or not I'll let the hourly rate stand I cannot tell you 
       until I have the kind of record evidence that I have 
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       requested from counsel. But I don't find [in] a case that 
       went for this long with motion practice and depositions 
       and review of documents and a full blown trial, and a 
       fight to the finish that -- that amount of fees for two 
       attorneys working on a case strikes me outrageous. 
 
(Evans' App. H, pp118-19) 
 
On May 11, 2000 the District Court issued a not-for- 
publication opinion addressing attorney's fees. The court 
first noted that counsel for Evans had made a timely filing 
of certifications addressing the propriety of the $300 hourly 
rate. The court also noted that attorneys for the Port 
Authority, although specifically directed to do so, did not 
file counter-certifications by the May 5 deadline. 8 The 
District Court wrote: 
 
       The [Port Authority] submission was not provided to 
       the Court on time, even though the May 5 deadline 
       gave [the Port Authority] a full three weeks to obtain 
       outside opinions and [the Port Authority] had already 
       had [Evans'] certification of services for months. 
       Instead, on May 8th, the Court received a letter from 
       [counsel for the Port Authority] enclosing a newspaper 
       article, which he uses as a basis for his contention that 
       the court must hold a hearing on the fee application. 
 
Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., No. 95-5094, letter 
opinion, p. 1-2 (D.N.J. May 11, 2000). 
 
While the District Court recognized that a hearing on fees 
may be required in some instances, it found that a hearing 
could only be helpful "in the context of a proper 
presentation of evidence on what the reasonable market 
rate actually is." Id. at 2. The Court found that holding a 
hearing would not be productive in this case because"the 
[Port Authority] has failed to offer any information on this 
subject." Id. The court then wrote: "[I] will not further add 
to the time and expense expended on this case by delaying 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Port Authority did file an affidavit bearing on appropriate hourly 
rates which was hand-delivered to the District Court five days late, on 
May 10th. Because this affidavit was not timely, it was not considered by 
the District Court. 
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decision on the reasonable hourly rate . . . based upon the 
competent evidence provided to me." Id. 
 
The court summarized this evidence as follows: 
 
       I have reviewed Certifications from two attorneys, 
       Robert Woodruff and Bruce P. McMoran.9  Both have 
       significant experience in the area of employment law. 
       Their conclusions are reasonable, and the information 
       their certifications have provided to the court regarding 
       hourly rates has been helpful. Accepting that the Third 
       Circuit has disapproved of a district judge relying 
       solely on personal knowledge in evaluating the 
       reasonableness of an hourly rate, Hurley, 174 F.3d at 
       132, it is nonetheless pertinent to note the referenced 
       certifications tell me nothing unexpected or surprising 
       about hourly rates charged in the community . . . . The 
       requested hourly rates charged by Mr. Hamlin and Mr. 
       Ridley are approved. 
 
Id. 
 
With respect to the Port Authority's allegation of 
excessive hours and unreasonable duplication of effort, the 
Court wrote: 
 
       On the record of proceedings held April 14th, I 
       addressed the [Port Authority]'s objections about the 
       amount of time spent and what it was spent for . . .. 
       There is nothing new before me to disturb my decision 
       to accept as reasonable the number of hours set forth 
       by [Evans'] attorneys in their Certifications. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. McMoran certified that he was a New Jersey attorney specializing in 
employment law and that his hourly rate was set at $375 per hour in 
July 2000, and that his rate had been $350 per hour from Jan. 1997. 
He did not say anything about community rates generally. 
 
Woodruff certified that he had been a civil rights attorney for twenty 
years and that he found the request for a $300/hr fee "to be within the 
framework of what might be expected to be awarded in the Essex County 
area." He noted that in 1994, a New Jersey state court set counsel fees 
in an NJLAD case at $275/hr. "[A]n hourly fee of $285.00 per hour 
awarded in 1994-1995 in Flemington offers a reasonable basis upon 
which a Court could consider an award of $300.00 per hour for a trial 
in Essex County in 1999." (Port Auth. App. V. III, p 91 et seq.) 
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Id. at 2-3. The District Court denied an additional fee award 
covering time spent in post-trial matters, finding that such 
an award would "stray[ ] outside the reasonable circle to be 
drawn around legal services. . . ." Id. at 3. The Court also 
declined to award an enhancement based on result or 
performance. 
 
In order to establish whether the approved fee award was 
reasonable, we turn first to the District Court's acceptance 
of the $300 hourly rate. An attorney requesting a fee award 
must establish that rate with reference to "the community 
billing rate charged by attorneys of equivalent skill and 
experience performing work of similar complexity." Student 
Public Interest Research Group v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 
842 F.2d 1436, 1450 (3d Cir. 1988). A fee applicant bears 
the burden of documenting the applicable hourly rate. In re 
TuTu Wells Contamination Litigation, 120 F.3d 368, 391 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
 
A District Court may not set attorney's fees based on a 
generalized sense of what is usual and proper but"must 
rely upon the record." Smith v. Philadelphia Housing 
Authority, 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1516 (3d Cir. 1996)). "The 
plaintiff bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence 
of what constitutes a reasonable market rate for the 
essential character and complexity of the legal services 
rendered in order to make out a prima facie case." Smith, 
107 F.3d at 225. Once the plaintiff has made the prima 
facie showing with respect to the appropriate hourly rate, 
that rate may be contested, "but only with appropriate 
record evidence. In the absence of such evidence, the 
plaintiff must be awarded attorneys' fees at her requested 
rate." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
Here, the District Court found that counsel for Evans 
succeeded in making a prima facie showing that $300 per 
hour was a reasonable market rate. There is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the rate set was clearly erroneous. 
This case presents an unusual situation, unlikely to recur, 
in that the Port Authority failed altogether to challenge the 
requested rate. Had the Port Authority met its obligation to 
contest that rate in a timely manner it might well have been 
able to establish that a lower rate was appropriate. Given 
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the state of the record the District Court properly accepted 
the $300 hourly rate.10 
 
We address next the Port Authority's contention that the 
fee award was inflated when Evans' attorneys each billed 
for work on the same projects. We have said that attorneys 
seeking fees must document the hours for which payment 
is sought "with sufficient specificity to allow the District 
Court to determine whether the hours claimed are 
unreasonable for the work performed." Washington, 89 F.3d 
at 1037. We have defined this to mean that the petitioning 
attorney must include fairly definite information as to 
hours devoted to various general activities, e.g., partial 
discovery, settlement negotiations, and the hours spent by 
various classes of attorneys. Id. at 1038. The billing records 
submitted by Evans' attorneys were specific enough to meet 
this standard. 
 
Once these records were submitted, the District Court 
was required to perform a "positive and affirmative function 
in the fee fixing process." Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 
181, 184 (3d Cir. 2001). A District Court is obligated to 
"review the time charged, decide whether the hours set out 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Court summarized events relating to the determination of the 
hourly rates as follows: 
 
       The Court ordered both parties to submit certifications of other 
       practitioners by April 28, 2000. This directive was objective and 
       specific, and as such did not require that the submissions be made 
       in an adversarial, point-counter point fashion. After all, [the 
Port 
       Authority] had known for months what [Evans'] attorneys were 
       defending as an appropriate hourly rate. For this reason, 
       submissions were due from both parties on the same date. While 
       [Evans] submitted [her] certification on time, [the Port Authority] 
       requested and was granted a week extension to May 5th. Seen in 
       the context of the court's directions of April 14th,[the Port 
       Authority]'s claim that it received only one week to submit its 
       certification while [Evans] received two weeks is wholly without 
       merit . . . [The Port Authority's] work should have begun on April 
       14th, and since its submission was not due until May 5th, [the Port 
       Authority] had more time, not less time than[Evans]. In light of 
this 
       . . . I will not reconsider my decision to disregard defendant's 
       certification. 
 
(Port Auth. App. V. I, p 13-14). 
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were reasonably expended for each of the particular 
purposes described and then exclude those that are 
`excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.' " Id. 
(quoting Pub. Int. Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 
F.3d 1179, 1188 (3d Cir. 1995)). "Hours that would not 
generally be billed to one's own client are not properly billed 
to an adversary." Id. "[T]he district court retains a great 
deal of discretion in deciding what a reasonable fee award 
is . . . ." Bell v. United Princeton Properties, Inc., 884 F.2d 
713, 721 (3d Cir. 1989). We have recognized that"[i]n 
determining whether the fee request is excessive . .. the 
court will inevitably be required to engaged in a fair amount 
of `judgment calling' based upon its experience with the 
case and its general experience as to how much time a case 
requires." Id. 
 
Despite the considerable discretion reserved to the 
District Court in the setting of a fee award, our role in 
reviewing that award is "not merely a passive[one]." 
Maldonado, 256 F.3d at 184. Accordingly, we have 
examined the billing records submitted by Evans' attorneys 
in light of the Port Authority's contention that the 
duplication of effort on the part of Evans' attorneys was 
excessive and unreasonable. Our review discloses multiple 
instances of duplicative billing for tasks which could not 
reasonably have required the identical expenditure of time 
by two partners, each billing at $300 per hour. For 
example, each of Evans' attorneys billed 23 hours for the 
drafting of the complaint in this matter. Substantial 
identical hours were also billed by each attorney for 
preparing interrogatories, preparing for and attending 
depositions, reviewing letters, and reviewing the Port 
Authority's disclosures. Both attorneys were present at trial 
and each billed time at the full hourly rate. 
 
These instances of precise overlap in both time and task 
cause us to conclude that the time claimed is not 
reasonable for the services performed. "Given[these 
attorneys'] professed expertise . . ., it would not have been 
unreasonable to expect" that one of them would have been 
able to handle most aspects of this matter, including the 
trial "alone or with the help of an associate." Lanni v. New 
Jersey, 259 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2001). For those tasks 
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where it is abundantly clear that the time of two attorneys 
was reasonably required, we have suggested that"awarding 
fees for [one partner's] time multiplied by an associate's 
rate may be justifiable." Id. Given the fairly straightforward 
nature of this case, we anticipate that the District Court 
will find that few tasks required the full participation of 
both attorneys. 
 
It is important that we reiterate our admonition in 
Maldonado that fee requests be subjected to a thorough 
and searching analysis. Contrary to the suggestion of the 
District Court, it is necessary that the Court "go line, by 
line, by line" through the billing records supporting the fee 
request. Our review of these records convinces us that the 
total time billed and the extent of the overlap in work 
performed by Evans' attorneys were extraordinary, and 
demand more than the cursory examination conducted by 
the District Court. 
 
In finding that the fee award is excessive, we do not 
ignore the District Court's opinion that substantial fees 
were warranted based on the length of the litigation, the 
"full blown" trial and the fact that the litigation was 
particularly contentious. Nor do we discount the fact that 
fees were driven up, in part, because the Port Authority 
failed repeatedly to meet time demands imposed by the 
court, necessitating expenditure of additional time and 
effort to secure compliance. Nonetheless, we are convinced 
that the award approved by the District Court more than 
accounts for these factors, appears excessive, and must be 
reduced substantially. Although its initial analysis of the 
fee petition was inadequate, the District Court remains "in 
the best position to know the complexity of the issues 
presented and the nature and quality of the work 
performed by [Evans'] attorneys." Loughner, 260 F.3d at 
182 (Nygaard, J., concurring and dissenting). Accordingly, 
we will not reduce the fee award ourselves, but will vacate 
the order of the District Court approving the award of 
attorney's fees and will remand this matter for recalculation 
of the award. 
 
VIII. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in all respects 
the May 11th order of the District Court denying the Port 
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Authority's request for a judgment N.O.V. or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial. We will, however, vacate the 
judgment and remand this matter to the District Court for 
a new trial on the limited issue of compensatory damages 
for emotional distress unless Evans elects to file a 
remittitur of damages in excess of $375,000. We will vacate 
the separate May 11th order of the District Court awarding 
Evans' counsel attorney's fees and will remand this matter 
for recalculation of the fee award. 
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